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Abstract. Machine learning is becoming an ever present part in our
lives as many decisions, e.g. to lend a credit, are no longer made by hu-
mans but by machine learning algorithms. However those decisions are
often unfair and discriminating individuals belonging to protected groups
based on race or gender. With the recent General Data Protection Reg-
ulation (GDPR) coming into effect, new awareness has been raised for
such issues and with computer scientists having such a large impact on
peoples lives it is necessary that actions are taken to discover and prevent
discrimination. This work aims to give an introduction into discrimina-
tion, legislative foundations to counter it and strategies to detect and
prevent machine learning algorithms from showing such behavior.
Keywords: Discrimination · Fairness · Machine learning · Interpretabil-
ity · General Data Protection Regulation
1 Introduction
Big data and modern pattern recognition algorithms together led to a number
of remarkable achievements in the last years. Algorithmic techniques surpassed
human performance in several tasks, ranging from classic Atari video games
[26] or board games like Go [52] to social games like Jeopardy [20]. Even more
interesting are the successes of algorithms in areas where humans typically dom-
inate, like reading comprehension [58] and image recognition [25]. Most of the
recent advances are accomplished by some kind of specialized artificial neural
network algorithm, that show a number of desirable characteristics like uni-
versal function approximation capabilities [28] and in some configurations even
turing completeness [51]. However, systems using way simpler algorithms than
the above mentioned, are already well capable of beating human experts when
it comes to predicting human behavior [13].
The rapid development of specialized versions of such algorithms surpassed the
construction of theory explaining the reasons for their behavior. However, due
to their performance advantages compared to humans, they get used more and
more in regular decision making processes. Algorithms already govern lots of
small decisions in our daily life: the ads that we see online, the composition of
our social media feeds and the newspaper articles, books and songs that we get
recommended. But it just begun that these systems are used to decide if a child
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gets a spot at a preferred school, if an prospective student gets the admission to
a university, if a entrepreneur gets a loan to start a business or if an individual
gets a callback for a job admission [4]. Such decisions can have a huge impact
on our lives and can determine if we can live up to our full potential or not. In-
transparent decisions, potentially flawed with stereotypes and prejudices about
certain groups are not acceptable in this process. Algorithmic decision making
promises to be less flawed by the biases incorporated in human decisions and
furthermore it could probably find even more nuanced relationships and patters
inside the vast inventory of available data than humans ever could. Furthermore
those systems get more accessible with the development of frameworks that can
achieve high accuracy even without domain knowledge neither about the algo-
rithms nor the task [46]. However, algorithmic decision making is always based
on generalizations that arise from past examples and decisions. Thus if past deci-
sions and examples already showed systematic biases like discrimination against
certain groups or individuals, an algorithm can not distinguish if that is for a
fair reason or just the product of some speculative judgement or worse: targeted
mistreatment. Therefore the assumed advantages could vanish and moreover the
algorithm can make matters worse: it can obfuscate discriminating decisions by
baking them into the more abstract and often undecipherable representation of
an algorithm. That is why such behavior is hard to explain and to spot in the
first place. Experts are rare and expensive in this field because of its rapid devel-
opment. Furthermore they can be unaware about the potential discrimination
arising from algorithmic decision making and thus these systems can be used for
extensive periods without anyone noticing any misbehavior.
In this paper the potential for discrimination induced by algorithmic decision
making is assessed and possible methods to cope with such behavior are pre-
sented and discussed. First the ethical and moral implications of discrimination
and equality are discussed in chapter two. Then the legal situation regarding
automated decision making in Germany and the European Union is explained.
After that, the main problems and sources of biased decision making of algo-
rithms are laid out in chapter four. Chapter five introduces several formal fairness
criteria and points out techniques to develop classification algorithms that satisfy
these criteria. The next two chapters present various more advanced methods
that look into the inner workings of algorithms and analyze causal relationships
in the decision making process. In chapter eight, a discussion is started to reflect
the diverse content and gives an outlook on future developments in the field of
fair machine learning. The last chapter concludes with some lessons learned.
2 Discrimination - A Short Introduction
Definition: The use of allegedly clear distinctions of abstract groups
to justify unequal treatment that leads to social disadvantages. The im-
posed disadvantages are not perceived as unjust, rather as a clear con-
sequence of the dissimilarity of the other. [50]
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The authors use the term ”abstract group” to denote that people put a sum of
other people that do not know each other, but all happen to have a salient feature
into a group and judge them based on some kind of assumed collective identity.
Examples for such group constructions are ”jews”, ”migrants”, ”women” and
many more that get collective attributes and attitudes assigned. Note that these
attributes are not individually assigned based on former experience with indi-
viduals. They are rather collectively assigned based on unsubstantiated infor-
mation or experience with a small sub-sample having the salient characteristic.
Disadvantages are always relative to a relevant comparison group. It would be
mistaken to refuse discrimination when comparing the treatment of e.g. women
in the german labor market with the treatment of women in the labor market
of saudi-arabia, because the latter are simply the wrong comparison group [2].
The disadvantages can be of various form, ranging from the exclusion of parts of
the social welfare program to the denied entrance to a night club. The education
system is an especially sensitive part when it comes to discrimination, since it is
often the base for future career possibilities but also a substantial prerequisite
to speak out and argue against discrimination. By imposing barriers on educa-
tional possibilities for discriminated groups, the discriminating group can impose
a sustaining dominance and therefore consolidate its position in society. Discrim-
ination gains traction with rising power imbalance between the groups and does
not necessarily reflect any ratio of the number of members between the discrim-
inating and the discriminated group. Discrimination can also have another layer
of complexity added when people get assigned to different discriminated groups
all at once, e.g. black queer women, which is called intersectional discrimination.
This recently really active field of study sheds light on discrimination among
discriminated groups and seeks a better understanding of the characteristics of
discrimination as an emergent property of the belonging to multiple subgroups.
People generally tend to form abstract groups not only for others but also for
themselves [1]. The group were oneself belongs to is called the ingroup, whereas
other groups are denoted as outgroups. Brewer [8] found that much bias and dis-
crimination is rather motivated by preferential treatment of ingroup members
longing to promote and maintain positive relationships among peers than hos-
tility towards outgroups. However, strong ingroup attachment is not necessary
for antagonism towards outgroups. Another view is that people compete for rare
goods in a society. These goods can be materialistic like housing or idealistic like
social recognition and that discrimination is a tool to gain an advantage in the
allocation of these goods. The observation that economic crisis typically lead to
higher levels of discrimination and xenophobia [5] comply with that theory, since
the goods that the members of a society compete for get scarcer during crisis.
Another form of discrimination is Statistical Discrimination, where prejudice
free agents behave discriminatory when making decisions under uncertainty and
with limited time, effort and information. Often easily observable and thus in-
expensive to collect features like age, gender or race are used to infer hard to
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measure or even unobservable characteristics like ability, motivation or talent.
This can result in discrimination of group members who differ from some cen-
tral tendency of their group distribution of the unobservable characteristic. The
group assignment in this case is not based on some visible salient feature and ru-
mors, but rather on the granularity of the available data. Since machine learning
(ML) is in context of human characteristics exactly used to infer hard to mea-
sure or even unobservable features, it could be prone to statistical discrimination.
Since ML is nowadays used to make important decisions about peoples fate,
it is important to detect discriminating behavior of such algorithms. A problem
imposed especially by Artificial Neural Network based algorithms is, that the
trained algorithm itself is a non-interpretable highly complex non-linear func-
tion, therefore often referred to as a black box. Hardt et al. [24] propose the
observational approach that circumvents the black box problem: In an ceteris
paribus experiment, an algorithm under analysis is fed with some data from a
possibly discriminated group, e.g. women, to predict some label. Then the group
membership is switched to the reference group, here male, and the difference
in outcome is analyzed. In that way, one can infer possible causal relationships
between the belonging to a possibly discriminated group and its effect on the
prediction made by an algorithm.
2.1 Equality of Opportunity (EoO)
Researchers from such diverse disciplines as economics, philosophy, computer
science, sociology and many more work on topics related to EoO. Therefore
the context in which EoO is analyzed often encompasses the distribution and
allocation of goods, services, educational prospects and job opportunities.
Formal Equality of Opportunity: Two notions of EoO are reported, the
weaker is called Formal Equality of Opportunity and is satisfied when people,
based on all relevant aspects for a certain task or study program have the same
chance to be taken and thus are treated equal [3]. According to the weak notion,
two students with the same grades in the same undergraduate program (e.g.
CS) should be treated equal when it comes to the graduate school admission
for a CS program. Another prospective student exists with an equal skill level
in the relevant field but who has a major in another subject, say economics,
and applies to the CS graduate program. In a perfect formal EoO world, the
student would have the same chance as the two other applicants. However in
the real world, proxy variables such as the grades in specific courses are used
to build a prediction about the ability. Thus an applicant who has no certifi-
cate about the specific courses might get rejected. Problems like this can be
circumvented by higher efforts from the admission office, like standardized tests
or interviews to check for motivation and ability, but they all come at a higher
cost for both the admission office and the applicant. Statistical discrimination
as explained before violates formal EoO too, since irrelevant aspects like specific
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certificates or cultural heritage are used as predictors for relevant but expensive
to obtain or unobservable aspects. Both examples show, that one weakness of
formal EoO is the definition of relevant aspects. Especially in an discrimination
context, there have been times in almost all countries of the western world, were
people were sure that certain minorities of the population are not capable of
the same achievements as the rest, due to some inevitable different trait verified
by some pseudo-scientific method. One could use this verifiable short coming as
an entry requirement to impose a barrier for that particular minority. Another
blind spot of formal EoO is that discriminated individuals can have worse ob-
servable relevant aspects due to long lasting structural inequality, even though
these individuals have the same level of motivation, eager and curiosity as their
non-discriminated peers.
Substantive Equality of Opportunity: Therefore the broader notion of EoO,
called Substantive Equality of Opportunity is satisfied when individuals with
same talents and ambition can achieve the same outcome in life [3]. This en-
compasses that for individuals belonging to socially disadvantaged groups, the
game of taking part in social participation is probably rigged from the moment
when their socially disadvantaged parents gave them birth. This is especially
interesting in context of high social immobility in germany compared to other
northern european countries [7]. Substantive EoO supporters advocate for the
state to step in and fill the gap by providing healthcare and educational possi-
bilities especially for children of socially disadvantaged families [32].
Affirmative action is another technique with the goal to reach higher substan-
tive EoO and is mostly pursued in the US and UK but probably will have an
impact on german assessment practices too. The concept is to uplift socially
disadvantaged groups to a level playing field to break the cycle of sustained dis-
crimination. This must be done as early as possible since the first certificates from
the education system already define a track for future educational prospects. It
can be accomplished by providing resources through redistribution of taxes or
transfers from rich neighborhoods to poor ones and some other redistributional
techniques only the state can employ. Other forms are the introduction of quotas
for specific university programs or job positions like the german female quota,
which obliges big companys to have 30% women in their supervisory board. The
overall goal of substantive EoO and therefore affirmative action is that every
individual in a society has the possibility to reach to their maximum potential.
However affirmative action policies are under criticism, because they sometimes
contradict formal EoO and directly discriminate someone based on their race.
A good example is the case of Michigans university admission practice that had
a quota on social disadvantaged groups based on racial background. The quota
led to the admission of students belonging to a disadvantaged group which had
worse grade point averages (GPAs) in their high school diplomas than other
candidates that got rejected. In 2003 it was challenged by a prospective student
that got rejected, despite her superior GPA. The US Supreme Court ruled in
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2003, that the universities practice to favor disadvantaged groups over the rest
is legal. In 2006 a poll among Michigan voters decided to abolish the practice
which was followed by several legal proceedings which are in ongoing trials about
the policy [34].
John Rawls’ Theory of Justice as Fairness: In the liberal political con-
ception, legitimacy of a political system is only the minimum in terms of moral
standards. This intuitively makes sense in context of Max Webers idea that reign
can be sufficiently legitimated by success [56]. For example an immoral system,
that brings economic advantages to broad parts of the population under con-
trol can be legitimated by its people if they just roughly behave economically
rational. Moral philosopher John Rawls describes justice in context of political
systems as an arrangement of institutions that are morally best and therefore
sets justice as the highest achievable state in terms of moral standards. Rawls
then defines justice as fairness among the constituents of a society and splits it
into the following two principles [57]:
1. First Principle (Liberty): Every individual in a society has some basic recip-
rocal rights like freedoms of expression or conscience, political participation
and property rights
2. Second Principle: Social and economic inequalities have to satisfy two con-
ditions:
(a) Substantial Equality of Opportunity is satisfied in the participation mech-
anism gatekeeping the advantages of these inequalities.
(b) Difference Principle: Inequalities are only accepted if they work to the
advantages of the most disadvantaged groups in society.
An example for the difference principle is the high salary of physicians compared
to say workers. The income inequality makes sure that a reasonable number of
people wish to become physicians and a higher number of physicians is beneficial
for the whole society. The difference principle is also satisfied by most affirma-
tive action policies, since the introduced inequalities typically benefit the most
disadvantaged groups.
Rawls came along with these ideas by applying a simply yet elegant thought
experiment called the original position. In this framework, it is assumed that
several individuals start at an hypothetical position where they are not part of
a society, but will be part of it in the future. The key element is that they do
not know in the first place into which part of the society they will be born.
So they do not have information about their future gender, geographic origin,
cultural background or anything else that could possibly lead to inequalities. In
this artificial position they have to negotiate the basic structures, duties and
prospects of a society. Since anybody has the chance to be born into any part of
the society, Rawls assumes that people would negotiate fair social institutions
for anyone in the society.
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3 Legal Situation - Germany
The german legislative introduced in 2006 the General Act on Equal Treatment
(GAET) where the following attributes are defined as protected:
– ethic or national origin and language
– gender or pregnancy
– religion or belief
– disability, chronic or mental illness
– age (both, old and young)
– sexual orientation
People having one of these attributes are protected from discrimination by the
legislation. §2 GAET explains the scope: legal entities have to comply with the
legislation in relation to conditions for the access of employment and promotion,
employment conditions like pay,reasons for dismissal, vocational training and
memberships and benefits of workers or employers organizations. Furthermore
they have to be treated equal when it comes to social security or other social
advantages, education and access to goods and services that are available to
the public, including housing. Nevertheless legislation referring to contractual
freedom exists too and makes it possible that people can refuse to make contracts
with individuals without specifying a reason. In §5 GAET the legislation refers
to positive action (i.e. affirmative action) and states that unequal treatment is
only allowed, when it is appropriate to prevent or compensate disadvantages
against protected groups. §8-10 GAET introduce additional limitations for the
equal treatment specified in §1-2 GAET, however these are not related to the
topic of this paper.
3.1 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
The European Union (EU) adopted the GDPR [18] in 2016 and it became en-
forceable in May 2018. The objective of the regulation is the protection of in-
dividuals in relation to the processing and movement of their personal data.
Therefore it introduces a fundamental right to the protection of personal data.
In the following some key sections concerning the topic of this paper are pre-
sented:
Article 4 GDPR gives several broad definitions about the terms used in the
document, e.g. personal data is defined as any information related to identifi-
able individuals, which could be identified via name, ID, location or other online
identifier. Most definitions are broad in the sense that they rather span too much
than to leave a definition gap and therefore allow data collectors to circumvent
the regulations.
Article 9 GDPR forbids the processing of personal data that reveals the mem-
bership to one of the protected groups. The protected groups are essentially the
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ones specified by the GAET and some more like membership in a trade union.
Furthermore article 9 GDPR makes it illegal to process without explicit consent
genetic or biometric data for the purpose of identifying an individual and data
concerning health or a persons sex life.
Articles 12-20 GDPR gives individuals the right to access their personal data if
collected by some legal entity. The data collector has to provide a concise and
accessible explanation of the data collected, the purpose of the processing and
the disclosure of data to third parties. The logic governing profiling practices
must be explained in an understandable way. Furthermore the planned length
of storage of the data has to be noted and the individual whose data has been
stored and/or processed (i.e. data subject) has the right for rectification or era-
sure of its data on the storage of the data collector.
Articles 21-22 GDPR gives an individual the right to object against automated
data processing and decision making. After objection, the data collector is no
longer allowed to process or base decisions concerning the individual on auto-
mated processing.
Article 35 GDPR obliges data collectors to assess the risks to the rights and
freedoms of individuals caused by their data collection and processing practices
prior to their deployment. The process is called Data Protection Impact Assess-
ment and has several official requirements and data collectors shall seek advice
from official data protection officers when in doubt.
Additional to the regulations in the GDPR and GAET, article 21 of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights (CFR) of the EU adds the social origin and property of
an individual to the protected groups. All regulations are probably sufficient for
formal EoO and make certain steps towards substantial EoO via the legalization
of affirmative action and the protection based on social origin. However the CFR
is just enforced in rare cases where a national legislation breaches it or when an
protected group is discriminated by the executive of a member state of the EU.
4 Discriminatory behavior of algorithm
For better accessibility, the next sections will analyze a reduced classification
problem where features X are used to predict label Y . The predictions of the
classifier are denoted as Yˆ . The input features X contain explicit or implicit (i.e.
latent) one or more protected characteristics A. A protected characteristic can
be for example any of the characteristics mentioned in §1 GAET. A real world
example for this classification setting could be a company, which seeks to process
personal data X from their employees. Besides a variety of other information, the
data set contains information about the gender A of each individual. The goal
of the company is to replace decisions about job promotions made by managers
with ones made by an automated classifier to improve fairness. Job promotions
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were either granted (Y = 1), or denied (Y = 0). Promotion decisions Y are
used together with data X to optimize a classifier, so that next years promotion
decisions Yˆ can be determined using the algorithm. Since the company wants
to have a fair algorithm and knows about the potential for discrimination that
could arise from including protected characteristics like an individuals gender,
the data scientist decides to remove feature A from the data set X. Unfortunately
this practice of fairness through unawareness usually does not make the
algorithm more fair and can even be harmful [4]. Rich data sets like X in our
example, typically contain a number of features which are slightly correlated
with protected variable A. Therefore these features can together be used to
predict the protected variable. If A is omitted, these other features correlated
with A will still carry the information about a protected group membership and
therefore the model does not become fairer. To highlight the case even further,
Sugimoto et al. [54] make the case that everything might reveal everything, in
the sense that given a sufficiently large feature space, one can probably infer all
unknown information about an individual. Some examples for this are presented
in the following:
– Danford and Reece [47] apply machine learning methods on instagram pho-
tos to predict the probability of an individual to suffer from depression. The
resulting model beats average human practitioners in unassisted diagnosis
accuracy. Suffering from mental illness is a protected variable under german
legislation.
– Kosinski and Wang [55] apply computer vision algorithms on facial images
from an online dating platform to predict the sexual orientation of individ-
uals with higher accuracy than humans. The proposed algorithm was able
to determine if an individual is gay or not based on a single photo in 81%
of the cases for males and 71% for females respectively. Human accuracy for
the same task is just 61% for men and 54% for women on average. Given
that homosexuality is illegal in several countries and an important reason for
unequal treatment in some others, the fact that a single picture can already
reveal it, can have a huge impact on people.
– Fiscella and Fremont [21] review methods to estimate race and ethnic back-
ground based on surnames and geolocations of individuals.
– Narayanan and Shmatikov [42] present several statistical methods to de-
anonymize large sparse datasets. They apply these methods to de-anonymize
individuals from the Netflix Prize dataset based on information about users
from the comments and ratings in the publicly available Internet Movie
Database (IMDB). The former dataset was made public by netflix in order
to organize a data science competition. After successful de-anonymization
a lawsuit against netflix was filed and the data science competition was
discontinued due to privacy concerns. The authors found that besides real
10 E. Baumann, J. L. Rumberger
identities, they could uncover apparent political preferences from the data.
– De Montjoye et al. [14] show that on average four spatio-temporal points
(geolocations with time tags) are sufficient to identify 95% of the individuals
in their dataset containing coarse mobility information about one and a
half million individuals during fifteen months. Since many applications on
smartphones or other devices require users to send current geolocations, one
can imagine the ease of de-anonymization.
4.1 Where does discriminatory behavior of algorithms come from?
Discriminatory behavior of algorithms can arise from several different factors.
The process from data generation and collection via pre-processing to inference,
post-processing and interpretation often involves the contributions of several
individuals often working in different departments or even different companys.
Therefore these factors are not obvious and easy to spot for any of the individ-
uals in the chain. In the following section some common problems that lead to
algorithmic bias against protected groups are explained. Since there could be
numerous other reasons for bias, this should not be regarded as a exhaustive
list.
Selection and Confirmation Bias: Lum and Isaac [37] analyzed algorithmic
systems for the allocation of patrolman, so called predictive policing systems,
used by the police department of Oakland, CA. Police officers used to allocate
patrolman into neighborhoods with high numbers of immigrants and low so-
cial prosperity due to biased decision making. The predictive policing system
learned that pattern and therefore proposed a similar allocation practice. Since
the patrolman were predominantly patrolling in quarters where people with im-
migration or low social background live, they did more police checks on these
people than on others. This is called selection bias, since the police already fo-
cuses on a certain subset of the population. The data that is generated by this
practice reflects the pattern, that more crime happens in these quarters than
elsewhere and therefore supports the allocation decision made by the predictive
policing system. This support for the already biased selection is called confirma-
tion bias and can result in self-sustaining cycles of discrimination. The authors
of the study found that black people are roughly targeted twice as much as white
people for drug controls. Even though official statistics show that both groups
show roughly equal rates of drug abuse.
Limited Features: Given a dataset containing personal data about a popula-
tion with a big proportion belonging to a homogeneous cultural majority and
a minority coming from diverse cultural backgrounds. Features that have high
explanatory power for the majority can have significantly lower or even reversed
explanatory power for the minority. Figure 1 illustrates this for the example of
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name checks, to separate real names (positive examples) from pseudonyms (neg-
ative examples). On the x-axis is the number of characters in a given name on
a normalized scale and on the y-axis is the inverse frequency of a given name
in the dataset. A classifier was trained on the data and its decision boundary is
shown as a black line separating the real names from the pseudonyms. In our
example the majority consists of western surnames like ”Cathy Amber”, ”Mike”
or ”Joanna” and the minority of southern indian surnames like ”Pilavullakandi
Thekkaparambil” or ”Villupuram Chinnaiahpillai”. The classifier showed 90%
accuracy overall. If one takes a closer look at the predictions, it becomes clear
that the algorithm has 100 % accuracy on the majority, but 0% accuracy on
the minority and therefore these features are infeasible to distinguish between
real names and pseudonyms for both groups at once. Problems like this were
reported during the 2011’s ”Nymwars” where Facebook and Google+ tried to
enforce a real-name policy on their platforms by banning accounts that used
pseudonyms.
Fig. 1. Classifier trained to separate real names (positive examples) from pseudonyms
Sample Size Disparity: Buolamwini and Gebru [9] analyzed several commer-
cial APIs from Google, Amazon and Microsoft that provide a gender recognition
service by analyzing images via computer vision algorithms. The authors found
that the software worked remarkably good for images of white individuals, with
accuracy rates up to 99% for white males and 93% for white females. When fed
with images of black individuals the accuracy dropped down to 86% for black
males and 70% for black females. The authors investigated that the used train-
ing datasets consisted of highly unbalanced samples of the population with up
to 86.2% individuals of lighter skin color. Therefore the algorithm preferably
learned patterns that helped to distinguish white males from females but are
not good applicable on black individuals. Sample size disparity can make the
problem of limited features more severe.
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5 Discrimination detection and prevention with the
observational approach
The observational approach, already mentioned in chapter 2, uses easily observ-
able characteristics like the features X including the protected variables A and
the target labels Y and their predictions Yˆ . By analyzing conditional probabil-
ities of Y or Yˆ given X and A, one can spot discriminating behaviors without
taking a look into the inner workings of the classifier employed on the data [24].
In practice the observational approach can be used to test classifiers of any form
by applying a simple ceteris-paribus experiment: the classifier gets fed with two
datasets: an original dataset and one where protected features or proxy variables
for these variables are swapped from a protected group to an unprotected one
and vice versa, holding the rest of the features fixed. After obtaining the classifi-
cations Yˆ , one can analyze the effects of belonging to a certain protected group
on the predictions Yˆ . Bertrand and Mullainathans provide a good example [6]:
they sent out identical fictitious job application documents (X) to a number of
companies and use different names, suggesting the gender and the ethnic back-
ground of a candidate (A). By doing so, they found that fictitious candidates
with white sounding names receive on average 50% more callbacks for job in-
terviews (Yˆ ) compared to identical candidates with black sounding names. The
strength of the observational approach is its applicability on any classification
process, automated or not, if the required observations are available. The ob-
servational approach then analyzes the accuracy, sensitivity and specificity of
the predictions made by the algorithm and uses them to infer fair classification
post-processing routines.
Since fairness is a debatable topic, there exist a number of papers that pro-
pose different kinds of fairness criteria. The group fairness criterion, also called
demographic parity, is satisfied when positive classifications Yˆ are statistically
independent from protected variables A. In other words: the percentage of indi-
viduals in a protected group which are classified as positive have to be the same
as the overall percentage of all individuals. On the other hand there exist two dif-
ferent individual fairness criteria which are satisfied when similar individuals get
a similar classification. The weaker form called equal opportunity just focuses on
positive classifications, whereas the stronger form called equalized odds focuses
on all classifications and misclassifications. Each has to be equal when comparing
the protected group to the rest of the population. The US Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) uses a relaxed form of the equal opportunity
fairness criterion to spot unequal treatment. They apply the so called 80% rule,
which allows a 20% difference in treatment of the protected group compared to
the rest.
5.1 Literature regarding the observational approach
One branch of papers seek to encode the original data into a fair representa-
tion, such that the protected group can no longer be inferred while all other
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information is retained as good as possible. Zemel et al. 2013 [61] propose an
approach that satisfies both, demographic parity and individual fairness after
the application of such an encoding. They write and train an algorithm to both
obfuscate the protected variables as well as preserving all relevant information to
retain high accuracy when using this encoded dataset for classification. Despite
demonstrating decent results, they report that their approach often results in
negative effects for different groups as more false positives from one group might
be used in order to achieve parity. Feldman et al. [19] propose the balanced error
rate as an accuracy measure that can be used to construct an unbiased data rep-
resentation. However, classifiers trained with this unbiased data representation
can exhibit the same behavior of adding false positives from the disadvantaged
group. Therefore the authors propose several methods to cope with that problem
by only partially changing the data set to construct an unbiased representation.
Furthermore they develop a likelihood-ratio based test, that can be used to de-
tect unequal treatment that exceeds a predefined maximum. This test can then
be directly used to test if a classifier complies with the aforementioned 80% rule
required by the EEOC. Edwards and Storkey [17] use adversarial learning to
build a fair representation of a cross-sectional dataset, but also to obfuscate pri-
vate information like names or number plates from images. Adversarial learning
is a two step approach: an encoder is used to encode the original dataset into a
fair representation and an adversary classifier uses this data to predict the pro-
tected variables. Both learning algorithms are trained, until the classifier cannot
distinguish any more if data came from a protected group or not. The authors
extend that model by introducing a decoder that tries to reconstruct the original
dataset from its fair representation to make sure that the dataset is changed as
little as possible while achieving the goal of constructing a fair representation.
Madras et al. [38] extend that model by introducing an adversarial that can in-
corporate each of the aforementioned fairness criteria. Additional to that, they
derive theoretical worst-case guarantees of the constructed fair representations,
which makes their method especially interesting for practitioners facing compli-
ance risks.
Another more recent branch of literature advocates a completely different tech-
nique, that does not construct a fair representation of the dataset. Instead the
original dataset is used to construct a classifier that predicts probabilities. Since
the objective of the classification problem is a binary outcome, the probabili-
ties have to be rounded up or down at some threshold. Zafar et al. [60] show,
that by using different thresholds, one can achieve different degrees of fairness
among the population. Again a classifier that complies with the EEOC’s 80%
rule can be constructed. Hardt et al. [24] extend this approach and introduce a
method to construct thresholds that shift the cost of misclassifications from the
disadvantaged group to the decision maker. Furthermore they present a detailed
analysis of the limitations of the observational approach. In the following sec-
tions, the fairness criteria are thoroughly examined and thresholding techniques
are explained.
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5.2 Demographic parity
Demographic parity as mentioned before is satisfied when the positive predictions
of a classifier Yˆ are statistically independent from the membership of a protected
group A = a.
P (Yˆ = 1|A = a) = P (Yˆ = 1|A = b) (1)
A positive classification here does not necessarily have to be beneficial for the
individual i.e. could also be a rejection inside an application process. The imple-
mentation of the fairness criterion is convenient, because it is not dependant on
the true values Y . The true values Y are in many cases really hard to define, to
observe and to measure. When it comes to job applications for example, what
is it that the employer is looking for in a candidate and how is it measured?
Often these true values Y are just noisy approximations, sometimes biased with
personal beliefs of individuals in the data generating process [4]. Demographic
parity is not sufficient to satisfy formal EoO as specified in chapter 2.1, because it
would not provide equal opportunities based on an individuals observable char-
acteristics. In fact it would give an advantage to individuals from the protected
group when it comes to positive classifications if the protected group is on aver-
age worse in the observed features than the rest. Because of that, demographic
parity can be used as a fairness criterion to implement an affirmative action
policy. That could leverage the opportunities of socially disadvantaged groups
and therefore might be a step towards substantial EoO (chapter 2.1).
5.3 Equal opportunity and equal odds
Demographic parity has a number of issues to where it cannot be considered a
fair adjustment to any decision. Furthermore, as demographic parity requires the
target and protected variables to be un-correlated, any instance where this is the
case cannot be predicted perfectly anymore [24]. An example for the necessity
of this measure would be a job hiring process for software engineers, where job
advertising should be seen by the right individuals. Here it is likely that more
men are targeted than women, strictly because there exist more men than women
in the profession of software engineer. Considering these issues, Hardt et al. 2016
[24] propose two new fairness measures, equalized odds and equal opportunity.
Equalized odds: This fairness criterion refers to the prediction Yˆ being inde-
pendent of A conditional on Y . For a binary classifier this means the constraint
requires the classifier to have equal true and false positive rates among all pro-
tected groups [24]. Equation 2 demonstrates equalized odds as two conditional
probability statements (1. True postives, 2. false positives).
P (Yˆ = 1|Y = 1, A = a) = P (Yˆ = 1|Y = 1, A = b)
P (Yˆ = 1|Y = 0, A = a) = P (Yˆ = 1|Y = 0, A = b)
(2)
Using the previous example of software engineer hiring process, the percentage
of women and men receiving an ad who are not software engineers has to be the
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same and the percentage of women and men receiving an ad who are software
engineers have to be the same.
Equal opportunity: The other concept proposed by Hardt et al. 2016 [24],
called equal opportunity, is a less strict version of equal odds, where only the
beneficial outcome has to be equal for all protected groups. Therefore the same
conditional probability holds, except the target being the constant beneficial out-
come. This can be compared to equal true positive rates for all groups. Again,
referring to Equation 2, equal opportunity only requires the first row to hold,
not the second. Relating this to a credit lending example, the percentage of in-
dividuals who should receive a credit as they are able to pay it back, should be
the same for all protected groups.
For both measures, this holds for binary and continuous classifiers, as for
continuous classifiers the conditions need to hold for any threshold to satisfy
equal odds or equal opportunity. Implementing equal odds or equal opportunity
can be done by correctly thresholding a classifier such that the above conditions
hold. This can be explained in a simple way using receiver operating character-
istic (ROC) curves. ROC curves can show the false positive rate in relation to
the true positive rate depending on the set threshold. Figure 2 shows optimal
thresholds using curves of two different protected classes (e.g. male, female). If
equalized odds has to be achieved, any point in the graph can be taken where
all curves intersect. As it is likely that there exists no such point, the threshold
has to be set optimally for the lowest curve and all other curves have to take on
a higher false positive rate. Considering Figure 2, if the curves did not intersect,
any point in the light red space can be considered. This means that for all groups
where the chosen threshold is not on the curve, there is a manual increase in
false positives which again produces similar issues as demographic parity.
Fig. 2. ROC Curve and True Postive Rate to Cost curve with equal odds / equal
opportunity selection. (Curves were created for this example)
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If only equalized opportunity is considered, the curve is instead drawn as
true positive rate to cost and it is attempted to minimize the average cost while
maximizing the average true positive rate. Cost here can either be the actual
financial cost for a business or a more general social cost for the specific groups.
However as critizized in other works [59], this approach requires information
on all protected variables of every individual. Hardt et al. [24] themselves also
report that this does not solve the issue of a dataset having biased labels. Zafar
et al. [59] demonstrate a similar approach they call disparate mistreatment. A
classifier suffers from disparate mistreatment if either false positive or false neg-
ative rates are not equal among protected groups. They weaken their constraint
saying that in specific applications such as incarceration one might only require
false negatives to be equal. Here their argument would be that it is worse to
falsely incarcerate somebody than to falsely let sombeody go. The constraint
is very similar to [24], however they propose a convex minimization problem
which classifiers should optimize in order to train the algorithm not to include
disparate mistreatement. This differentiates them from the work of Hardt et. al
as the classifier can then be used for new examples whereas Hardts approach
post-processes predictions. For both approaches another issue is the availabilty
of ground truth. Both methods require that the data includes ground truth, e.g.
that a person has actually commited a crime or is actually a software engineer
or not. In cases like criminal classification, the information whether a person
actually committed a crime might never be available. Both individual fairness
criteria can satisfy formal EoO, if all sources of bias in the data collection process
are ruled out. Substantial EoO could in theory be achieved, if a classifier is fed
with a data set that includes strong proxies for ambition and talent, while omit-
ting any data that is generated by the biased processes a socially disadvantaged
individual has to cope with.
5.4 Calibration
A third observational approach, often simply referred to as calibration, is a
fairness criteria which in many cases already holds as algorithms optimize for
it to hold if they are able to observe the sensitive variables [4]. In their book,
Barocas et al. [4], they call this criterion sufficiency, as the classifier Yˆ is sufficient
for predicting the target Y and it incorporates the protected variable A (see
equation 3).
P (Y = 1|Yˆ = yˆ, A = a) = P (Y = 1|Yˆ = yˆ, A = b) (3)
A correctly calibrated classifier supports this notion as for every class of A holds:
P (Y = 1|Yˆ = yˆ) = yˆ (4)
To understand calibration, consider figure 3. We see the relation of probability
of being in group Y = 1 and the percentage of the group being in Y = 1 for that
specific probability. An optimally calibrated classifier here would always attempt
to have the percentage of individuals with a specific score to be equivalent to
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Fig. 3. Uncalibrated classifier. Logistic regression on income predictions using UCI
Adult Census Dataset [15]
that probability score. Therefore the optimally calibrated classifier would have
all curves on the diagonal. Calibration methods are forms of post-processing,
where the ground truth is not required [4]. To calibrate an algorithm, a model
such as logistic regression and the prediction and outcome values for every group
is considered. This addtional model attempts to move the curve closer to the
diagonal. An example for this technique is Platt-scaling which was originally
designed for support vector machines but can be applied to any classification
problem [45]. This type of fairness is also picked up by Chouldechova [11]. They
additionally argue that predictive parity is mutually exclusive with calibration by
group and therefore for every specific task, the impact of applied fairness criteria
has to be understood. However not only these two fairness criteria are mutually
exclusive which leads us to the problems and limitations of the observational
approach.
5.5 Limitations of the observational approach
Even though all three criteria for fairness and non-discrimination cover a differ-
ent type of fairness, no two of the criteria can be applied at the same time. For
the first criteria, demographic parity, fairness is achieved by disregarding the
protected attribute but both other criteria explicitly make use of the protected
variable and allow for dependencies between protected variables and classifier.
However, equalized odds and equal opportunity are also in conflict with calibra-
tion methods as proven by [11]. Because of the exclusivity, practitioners have to
choose which fairness criteria to apply. This in turn can be difficult as it may
lead to additional discrimination [33]. Specifically equal odds and demographic
parity may lead to an increase in false positives for some protected groups, which
in turn for example could lead to an increase in hired software engineers who
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are no software engineers. This hiring of incompetent individuals will in turn
be noticed by individuals of other groups and can then be taken as a simple
discriminating argument against the entire group being viable for the software
engineer position. This effect can to some extent be observed in the womens
quota in germany, where radical opponents of the quota use any false positive as
a reason for outrage (see e.g. [12]). Another issue is the disregard of long-term
impact of decisions, because fairness at decision time can have negative impact in
the long run. Take for example credit lending, where we could apply equal false
and true positive rates for all groups. However a false positive here means that
the person will default in the future leaving them with financial ruin. Finally,
considering that individuals can have potentially discriminating intentions, by
knowing the criteria, they can influence the gathered observations such that the
intended discrimination is reflected perfectly in the dataset.
5.6 An impossible example
To introduce the next chapter on causal reasoning, we will construct an example
based on [30,24] with two rather different scenarios from a fairness standpoint
which yet behave equal when considering observational criteria. The scenarios in
this example are again related to the example of showing software engineering
job advertisments to men and women. Figure 4 shows causality graphs for those
scenarios, where arrows indicate correlation or that A in parts produces B and
boxes represent variables and classifiers.
Fig. 4. Indistiguishable examples for observational criteria
1. The first scenario in Figure 4 uses biological sex as a protected variable,
the binary indicator wether a person plays the videogame Candy Crush, the
binary indicator wether somebody uses the popular programming support
site Stack Overflow and the target wether an individual is a software engineer
(binary as well). The optimal prediction in this scenario would take both
Candy Crush and Stack Overflow use into account because Candy Crush is
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a weak proxy for biological sex and sex and software engineer are correlated.
Stack Overflow is directly generated from software engineer and therefore a
good indicator by itself. The predictor using equalized odds would refrain
from using Candy Crush and stick to Stack Overflow as then the conditional
independence of the predictor as seen in Equation 2 holds.
2. The second scenario in Figure 4 again uses biological sex as the protected
variable and binary variable wether an individual studied computer science.
The target variable here is directly generated from the computer science
studying variable which is intuitive. An optimal predictor would take only
the computer science course in order to predict the target. However when
trying to achieve equalized odds, the predictor has to take the sex variable
into account to adjust for the correlation between protected variable and
independent variable.
Using these scenarios, Hardt et al. [24] show that it is possible to construct
equal distributions for all variables such that the observable fairness indicators
such as true and false positive rate are identical. Therefore if arguing that the
perfect predictor is fair, one would allow the use of a variable directly indicating
a protected variable or on the other hand, if arguing that the equalized odds
predictor is fair, one would have to accept that it uses the protected variable to
adjust for discrimination. This can be especially problematic if the use of such
protected variables is forbidden, as the observational approach cannot decern
wether the protected variable was used. Therefore Kilbertus et al. [30] propose a
new approach to detect and avoid discrimination in machine learning based on
causal reasoning by Pearl [43].
6 Literature: Discrimination detection and prevention
with causal reasoning
With his book on causality [43], Pearl lays the foundation for several causal in-
ference approaches in the context of fairness. His approach of generating a set
of confounding variables which explain causality between two variables X and
Y allows the identification of causal graphs which in turn can be used to display
causality as simple probability statements cannot [43, p. 70]. This approach aims
at providing information on causation instead of correlation. Causation aims to
infer how data was generated and how different variables were generated from
other variables. Contrary to the observational approach, causal inference and
causal reasoning require domain knowledge, i.e. one has to be able to reason
about causality in the specific domain [44]. The example in figure 4 already uses
a notation known as a causal graph which allows for a graphical visualization
of the data generating process and is a directed acyclic graph. Contrary to the
observational approach this now allows for assumptions about the relations and
dependency structures within data and classifier. Kilbertus et al. [30] differen-
tiate between two new patterns of discrimination observable within such causal
graphs namely unresolved discrimination and proxy discrimination. To find both
structures, we always consider paths from protected variables to the classifier.
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Unresolved Discrimination For the first issue, consider all paths from the
protected variable to the classifier to be discriminating or potential issues. The
exceptions are paths which are blocked by a variable which is considered re-
solving. Blocking means that the variable lies on the path between first and
last variable and can be the last variable itself. Resolving are variables which
are partially generated by the protected variable but are not considered to be
discriminating [30]. Taking the example of figure 4, stack overflow is on the
path from sex to both predictors but can be considered non-discriminating as
the probability to use it is likely the same for software engineers regardless of
genders.
Proxy Discrimination For the second issue, again consider all paths from the
protected variable to the classifier, but assume all are not discriminating. The
exception here is any path which contains a proxy, a variable which is generated
by a protected variable and not considered a resolving variable . However the
path then is only considered to exhibit potential proxy discrimination, which
then has to be checked by doing an intervention [30]. Taking the same example
as for unresolved discrimination, candy crush is not a resolving variable as its
sole purpose in the model is the approximation of sex using it. This approach,
compared to detecting unresolved discrimination, is managed more easily as we
only consider paths an issue if it is blocked by a proxy. Every proxy is labelled
manually, therefore the number of problematic paths reduced.
Preventing discrimination using causal inference After identifying dis-
criminating variables and paths, one can alter the predictor with an optimization
problem such that neither unresolved discrimination nor proxy discrimination
are present. Starting out, one has to develop a structural equation model out
of the dependency graph. Then all influences on the problematic variable have
to be removed and all equations are combined into one equation defining the
predictor R. Then, depending if proxies or resolving variables are considered,
the proxy P has to be intervened on or the protected variable A. The goal of the
optimization problem is an equal probability distribution of R for all possible
interventions. An intervention is a process where all variables are fixated except
for the problematic variable e.g. the proxy.
Nabi and Shpitser [41] argue in a similar direction, as they gather disallowed
paths and calculate a path specific effect which demonstrates the multiplier
impact of a protected variable on a target variable. They then impose restrictions
on their optimization problem such that for any problematic path the path
specific effect is around 1, resulting in basically no effect.
6.1 Counterfactual Fairness
Kusner et al [33] propose a different approach which also has its roots in Pearls
work [43]. Again a structural equation model is developed which consitutes of
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assumptions made of the generation of underlying data. According to them a pre-
dictor is counterfactually fair if the distribution of predictor Yˆ does not change
if the protected variable A is changed while all non causally dependent variables
X are held fixed. However they do not explicitly specify problematic paths or
proxy variables but instead try to augment their data with additional latent
causal variables U . These latent causal variables stem from a distribution of an
underlying causal model. This model, similar to the causal inference approach by
Kilbertus et al. [30], is again constructed by using domain knowledge yet they ar-
gue that it should be constantly re-evaluated when new information is available
or new observations can only be explained with additional latent variables. In an
extension of [33], Russell et al. [49] provide an algorithm that no longer requires
an exact causal model but instead allows for an approximation of counterfactual
fairness across multiple causal models. These causal models could be different
variants or originate from different statistical models and allow statisticians with
less domain knowledge to make use of an approximate counterfactual fairness.
The causal approach can identify discrimination in different ways and can de-
velop models that avoid proxies of protected variables or include resolving vari-
ables. Yet the approach is complex and requires assumptions based on domain
knowledge. Compared to the observational approach it does not just treat mod-
els as black boxes but there is another discipline within machine learning that
attempts to make machine learning models interpretable and understandable
which in turn can help to discover and avoid discrimination.
7 Interpretability
Interpretability of machine learning models has yet to be properly defined [35].
Doshi-Velez and Kim provide their definition with the ability to explain or to
present in understandable terms to a human[16]. Lipton [35] in an attempt to
develop a definition therefore defines different contexts to which interpretabil-
ity applies, specifically trust, causality, transferability, informativeness and fair
and ethical decision-making. As the focus of our work lies on discrimination,
we will mainly consider the fair and ethical decision making context. Accord-
ing to Goodman and Flaxman [22] this means that any model that should be
interpretable needs to be able to be understood as well as articulated by hu-
mans. This of course relates to the right to explanation in the GDPR as here it
is also not defined what exactly the explanation entails. The legislation further
supports the notion that some form of interpretability is needed particularly for
very complex models.
7.1 Realizing interpretability
Lipton [35] differentiates between different methods to make models interpretable
which we will put into the fairness and discrimination context. He creates two
not necessarily exclusive groups, transparency and post-hoc interpretability.
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Transparency: Transparency aims explain the workings of an algorithm by
making its decisions or the entire learning process understandable. The first
option to provide transparency is to only use models which can be comprehended
in their entirety by humans. This means that the model can be computed by a
human in a small timeframe [35]. Ribeiro et al. [48] argue in a similar direction
as they require a model to be presented to the user including images and text
which further explain the model. However this presentation can get out of hand
quickly if we consider any high dimensional data. Lou et al. [36] present another
form of interpretability through transparency by arguing that a models features
or decision points should be used as simple explanations. Specifically decision
trees and regression models support this form of intelligibilty as e.g. in a tree
a split could be all individuals from a bad neighborhood do not recieve a loan.
Lipton [35] argues here that often weights and splits are largely based on which
specific input variables where selected and the actual explanation in a real world
context would be questionable at best. In the context of a right to explanation
and fairness, the transparency way of achieving interpretability largely requires
very simple models with very limited data. As such models are often not capable
of capturing complex relations, this would require sacrificing model accuracy for
the benefit of being able to make the algorithm transparent to some extent.
Post-hoc interpretability: Post-hoc interpretability make use of already trained
models and therefore do not explicitly explain the exact workings of an algo-
rithm. Instead the goal here is to give useful information about the model in
order to understand its decisions [35]. One popular approach is, given a spe-
cific instance in a dataset which is to be discussed, to refer to similar instances
i.e. instances which have similar activations in a neural network [10]. Similar to
methods like case studies, this approach allows explanation which is very com-
mon for doctors when prescribing medicine (give sb. medicine because a very
similar patient also got medicine and healed). This approach can be done after
training as all model parameters are available to construct a table for similarity
measurement. An alternative approach is the visualization or textualization of
model parameters, which could also be part of the transparency approach of
Ribeiro et al. [48]. Krening et al. [31] demonstrate textualization of decisions.
They train a reinforcement learner which attempts to play super mario bros. by
using and correctly classifying advice and warnings from human users. This sort
of model could then also be used to output textual decisions when presented
with a situation. McAuley and Leskovec [39] train a latent-factor recommender
system with review topics such that when returning a score on how likely the user
will like a certain product, it can also give topical reasons for the user preference.
Adding text to numbers indicating decisions can accordingly help to intuitively
understand the decision making process of an algorithm. Visualization to support
interpretability is particularly important for algorithms analyizing images as a
numeric representation would be less easily comprehensible. An early example
of visualizing a convolutional neural networks features is presented by Simonyan
et al. [53]. They generate images representative of a specific class to illustrate
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what the network thinks such an object looks like. Furthermore they also gen-
erate saliency maps, indicating which areas of an input image were particularly
impactful when deciding for a specific class. Both visualizations can help un-
derstand why the network provided such probability scores. An example can
be found in Figure 5. The post-hoc form of interpretability can be particularly
Fig. 5. Class representations and Saliency maps [53]
helpful for companies which already have an active machine learning classifier
and now with the GDPR need to explain how decisions were made.
Both basic forms of interpretability can help make avoid discriminating deci-
sions or help to prove that an algorithm is not discriminating based on a pro-
tected attribute. Yet interpretability, apart from its lack of proper definition,
has some issues. Firstly it, to some extent, requires machine learning models
to never surpass human ability as it then automatically becomes more complex
than is comprehensible. Secondly, because particularly post-hoc interpretability
is also based on algorithms which are not transparent, the evaluations can be
constructed such that they show no discriminating behavior yet the model still
discriminates against a protected class. Here the person trying to understand the
decision would again need to know how exactly the post-hoc interpretation was
created [35]. With the right to explanation, interpretability is a new necessity
for any industries using machine learning to make decisions impacting individ-
uals. However works like Hirsch et al. [27] already go one step further saying
that algorithms not only have to be interpretable but contestable by affected
individuals. This contestability includes possible modifications if the individual
is rightly contesting the decision.
8 Discussion
Discrimination in machine learning has been an issue since companies started
using algorithms to make important decisions. Already in 2006, an insurance
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company was sued for discriminating insurance scoring using an algorithm [29].
New awareness has been achieved by the european union as new legislation now
enforces a right to explanation [18]. Machine learning algorithms are made to
discriminate, however they do not have to do so in a legal and ethical sense. The
main reason for discrimination in machine learning seems to be the dataset an
algorithm is trained on, if there is bias towards one group in the dataset, the
algorithm will reflect it. If the dataset is unbalanced, the algorithm will reflect
that as well. Using this information, discrimination can already be prevented by
gathering unbiased and fair datasets which can also be supported by methods
like causal inference. However considering that not every individual has only
good intentions, the same can be done to achieve negative effect on other pro-
tected groups. For example, a potentially racist policeman could only ever check
individuals of another ethnic group such that arrests only happen within that
group. A dataset about arrests in an area would then reflect that unbalance.
However often this kind of discrimination does not happen on purpose. Instead
data scientists are simply not aware of the issues with their data and algorithm.
8.1 Awareness
Accordingly, one of the main issues regarding discrimination is the lack of aware-
ness among practitioners. Simply by being aware, one can read into literature
concerning the topic and can take steps to prevent discrimination in the own
use case. Particularly when the algorithm one is writing strongly affects the life
of an individual in cases such as arrest likelihood, insurance and credit lending.
Awareness can be supported by a diverse workplace. With members of different
protected groups present in a team, each individual is more sensitive of issues of
another protected group and members of a discriminated group can immediately
raise warnings. In the same way it may be necessary to have computer sciences
students learn about discrimination, as it is often not part of their course. Es-
pecially knowing about the own impact on discriminating decisions and how to
prevent them needs to be in the back of the mind of any person writing algo-
rithms, which could strongly impact others lifes. Currently many students are
oblivious to such issues and do not take actions to change this. Nonetheless be-
ing aware of issues is often not enough. Instead, domain knowledge is required.
Machine learning algorithms and their implementations are constructed in a
way that a practitioner can apply such algorithms to any dataset containing
any number of variables of any type. Thus it is very simple to achieve a high
accuracy. Yet there is no knowledge about the effect of different variables on
each other, the meaning of variables and the potentially discriminating effect of
variables. Specifically strategies like causal inference [30] can only be used when
one can reason about causality and build causal models, which requires both
domain knowledge into the topic of inference and about the inner workings of
the employed algorithm.
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8.2 Regarding prevention strategies
Then again, even if one is aware of such issues, the proposed prevention strate-
gies are lacking in many cases. The observational approaches such as equalized
odds and equal opportunity are good starting points to evaluate discriminat-
ing behavior and to implement ethical ideals. Because theses approaches require
information on protected variables, they are often not feasible in practice. Fur-
thermore these approaches are very dependent on the used dataset and can be
manipulated easily. Causal approaches on the other hand are very complex and
require expertise in the domain the algorithm is applied to. The issues here is
to build the right causal models and make the right assumptions about the gen-
erative process of the underlying data which is increasingly difficult, the more
abstract the available data. Even multi-world approaches like Russell et al. [49]
cannot guarantee fairness and non-discrimination. Finally, all causal approaches
require human decisions on which variables to classify as non-discriminating.
Interpretability has to be another focus for practitioners as it is a way to create
trust between affected individuals and algorithmic decisions. With the GDPR,
interpretability is a requirement for any company making use of machine learn-
ing techniques, but this creates a conflict between the ability to solve very com-
plex problems and the possibility to completely understand the decision-making
process. Interpretability in any case supports the human review process when
deciding whether an algorithm is discriminating against a protected group or
not. Considering that all approaches show downsides, the best approach is likely
to attempt to combine all three methods, making use of observable and causal
procedures and facilitating them by highly interpretable algorithms.
8.3 Future outlook
The scientific community around machine learning is starting to put more effort
into topics like fairness, discrimination and interpretability with total number of
search results on the topic of fairness in machine learning having doubled since
2010 and interpretability having received almost 17500 new results [23]. This of
course is further sped up by new legislations like the GDPR in europe and new
insitutions set up by the European Union such as the European Data Protec-
tion Supervisor. These institutions will further improve legislations and likely
properly define what an explanation for an algorithmic decision entails. It might
be necessary to setup an institution that analyzes algorithms of companies and
institutions and searches for discriminating behavior similar to what already ex-
ists for Vehicles and safety concerns or restaurants and hygene. Another issue for
the future will be more and more complex algorithms where exact explanations
are impossible. Hence explanations need to be simplified but according to works
like Miller [40] simple less accurate human-like explanations might be a better
option anyway. Discrimination and fairness will depend on human intervention
at least until ethics can be part of algorithms making humans, especially data
scientists and machine learning experts, responsible to take action against any
form of discrimination they can discover or that is reported.
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9 Conclusion
In this work we demonstrated discrimination as a problem in machine learning.
We evaluated definitions and legal policies both on discrimination and algo-
rithmic discrimination. This work then gave an overview on strategies to dis-
cover discriminating behavior and introductions to observational and causal ap-
proaches to prevent discrimination. We also demonstrated that interpretability
can support processes to identify and prevent discrimination. Discrimination in
machine learning has to be moved towards the center of attention especially in
a diverse and global world such that decision-makers put resources into creating
discrimination free algorithms. More work is needed in the field of fairness and
interpretability and universities should start to require students in computer sci-
ence and similar courses to take classes in ethics in computer science. The first
step towards fairness is awareness.
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